



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## MIKOLAJCZYK VISIT TO MOSCOW MAY BRING COMPROMISE

THE decision of Premier Mikolajczyk to fly to Moscow for conversations with Stalin, announced in London on July 27, has strengthened the hope that a compromise settlement may yet be worked out between the Polish government-in-exile and the Soviet government, which on July 26 concluded an administrative agreement with the newly formed Polish Committee of Liberation. The establishment of this committee, announced on July 22 from Chelm, the first large town on Polish territory west of the Curzon Line to be liberated by the Russian army, came as a surprise to those in London and Washington who had viewed prospects for Russo-Polish agreement with increasing optimism. Yet the very speed of the Russian military advance accelerated political developments to a degree exceeding the expectations of the Polish government-in-exile, and possibly even of Moscow, necessitating prompt decisions that could brook no delay.

Upon entering territory which—in contrast to Eastern Poland—it regards as Polish the Soviet government, in a statement of July 25, announced that it did not intend to establish organs of its own administration, "considering this the task of the Polish people." It also declared, in terms similar to those used when Russian troops entered Rumania on April 2, that "it does not pursue aims of acquiring any part of Polish territory or of a change of social structure in Poland, and that the military operations of the Red Army on the territory of Poland are dictated solely by military necessity and by the striving to render the friendly Polish people aid in its liberation from German occupation." The Soviet government has not recognized the Polish Committee as the government of Poland—any more than the United States, which is now negotiating an agreement with General de Gaulle concerning administration of liberated France, has recognized the French Committee of National Liberation.

AGREEMENT ON LIBERATED AREAS. The agreement concluded in Moscow on July 26 by the Soviet government and the Polish Committee is similar to that concluded by the Soviet government with Czechoslovakia on May 8. It provides that in the zone of military operations on Polish territory after the entry of Russian troops, "supreme power and responsibility in all affairs relating to the conduct of the war for the time necessary for the execution of military operations" shall be concentrated in the hands of the Russian Commander-in-Chief. As soon as any part of the liberated territory of Poland ceases to be a zone of direct military operations, the Polish Committee "shall fully assume the direction of all affairs of civil administration." While all Russian military personnel shall be under the jurisdiction of the Russian Commander-in-Chief, all personnel of the Polish armed forces "shall be subordinated to Polish military laws and regulations." The civilian population, even in cases of crimes committed against Russian troops (except for crimes committed in the zone of military operations), shall be under Polish jurisdiction. A special agreement is to be concluded regarding financial and economic problems relating to the stay of Russian troops on the territory of Poland, as well as those relating to Polish armed forces which are being formed on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

It will be recalled that, on January 11, the U.S.S.R. offered to re-establish relations with the Polish government—which it had broken off in 1943 following the Katyn incident—provided that government rid itself of certain individuals regarded in Moscow as hostile to Russia, and agreed to territorial negotiations on the basis of the Curzon Line.\* Neither of these conditions was acceptable to all the members of the Polish government, which is composed

\* "Russia Proposes Polish Border Settlement," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 14, 1944.

of representatives of the major parties in pre-war Poland, with the exception of Fascists on the extreme right and Communists on the extreme left.

**MIKOLAJCZYK'S PROBLEMS.** Premier Mikolajczyk, leader of the Peasant party, however, is said to be ready, personally, to negotiate on the basis of the Russian proposals of January 11, and to be favorably regarded in Moscow. His chief problems have been first, how to effect the purge of his cabinet demanded by the Russians and, second, how to obtain his government's consent to the Curzon Line. Now that Russian troops are on Polish territory and in a position to bar the return of the exiled government, the latter has displayed a greater spirit of conciliation—but only after denouncing the Committee as a body of "usurpers, nobodies, turncoats and Communists." It is true that the Polish Committee is by no means as widely representative of the pre-war political groups in Poland as the government-in-exile, being composed in large part of Communists and Communist sympathizers—and has been intemperate in its denunciation of the London government. But the impression persists that Moscow is not committed to a Communist or semi-Communist régime in Poland, and might settle for a coalition cabinet that would include some individuals now in London—possibly Mikolajczyk himself—and some of those now in the Polish Committee. On this point, as well as on final determination of the Russo-Polish boundary, the U.S.S.R., now riding a wave of military victories, is in a position, in turn, to display a spirit of conciliation. Some compromise is essential from the military, as well as the political point of view, since at the present time Polish forces abroad are

divided—some fighting with the British and Americans in Italy, under the orders of General Sosnkowski, War Minister in the Mikolajczyk cabinet, and some with the Russians, under the command of General Berling.

The manifesto issued by the Polish Committee does not differ materially from the program of political, economic and social reforms elaborated by Mikolajczyk and his Deputy Prime Minister, Jan Kwapinski, leader of the Socialist party—except on one important point, that of foreign policy. It not only urges collaboration with Russia and accepts the transfer to Russia of Eastern Poland, but also demands the transfer to Poland of Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia, all part of Germany in 1939, with a population of 10 million Germans—a deal proposed by Russia on January 11 but rejected by the Polish government. Otherwise, both the government in London and the Polish group in Chelm are committed to termination of the dictatorial régime created by Marshal Pilsudski under the constitution of 1935, and to a series of industrial and agrarian changes which, while retaining private enterprise, would establish a considerable measure of state control over the nation's economy. The United States continues to recognize the Polish government in London, and has apparently sought no information from the U.S.S.R. concerning its ultimate intentions toward the Polish Committee. Yet it is clear that Russia's decision on Poland—so far taken unilaterally, not in consultation with its western Allies—will not only be viewed as a test of its post-war foreign policy, but will also have a profound effect on its future relations with Britain and the United States.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## U.S. QUARANTINE OF ARGENTINA REQUIRES HEMISPHERE SUPPORT

The statement on relations with Argentina made public by the State Department on July 26 indicates that a more aggressive attitude is replacing that of "watchful waiting" which has characterized our stand for the past six months. By calling on the American Republics and other United Nations to adhere to the present policy of non-recognition of the Farrell régime, the State Department is endeavoring to complete the diplomatic isolation of Argentina which began with the withdrawal of envoys by all the American states except Paraguay.

Replying to a 25,000-word Argentine "white paper," the memorandum brusquely states that Argentina had not only "deliberately violated the pledge taken jointly with its sister republics to cooperate in support of the war against the Axis powers," thereby striking "a powerful blow at the whole system of hemispheric cooperation," but had also "openly and notoriously been giving affirmative assistance to the declared enemies of the United Na-

tions." Where the Argentine document brought little evidence to support its evasive generalities regarding collaboration with the continent, the Hull memorandum gives chapter and verse on the various ways in which that nation has been giving constant "aid and comfort" to the Axis.

**U.S. STATEMENT RALLIES ARGENTINES.** While the immediate reaction in Buenos Aires was less violent than had perhaps been anticipated, it was also more united. The memorandum has had the effect of rallying behind the present military government elements hitherto disposed to be friendly toward the United Nations. Ambassador Adrian Escobar was recalled from Washington as a "first measure" intended to arouse Argentines to a sense of the "detriment to their dignity." The following day, Foreign Minister Orlando Peluffo went on the air with a defense of Argentine policy which was significant chiefly for what it left unsaid. Omitting to reply to the charges that the Farrell government

had been giving fat contracts to Axis firms located in Argentina, involving the use of materials supplied by the United Nations, Peluffo contented himself with following the now well-established line that the régime had fulfilled all obligations with respect to continental solidarity and would defend its sovereignty against any foreign intervention in internal or external affairs. In his remarks he made no answer to the allegation that Argentina was contemplating aggressive action against neighboring countries. He climaxed his speech by announcing the lifting of the much-hated censorship of the press. In view of the tempered approval of government policies recently expressed in the editorials of the liberal Buenos Aires dailies—*La Nación* and *La Prensa*—the government may believe that it is safe in relaxing—ostensibly at least—its press controls.

The easing of censorship restrictions would seem to be in accord with Vice President Péron's announcement on July 22 that the military phase of the revolution had been concluded and a new stage reached, in which the army would retire and the people would take over and carry out the principles of the revolution. Whether this means that Péron now considers his prestige with the labor element strong enough to risk popular elections and relegate the colonels' government to the background remains to be seen. Even if Péron assumes the Presidency, as is generally expected, his June 10 speech calling for total defense precludes the hope that with the new phase would come more peaceful relations with the rest of the continent.

**IS UNITED ACTION POSSIBLE?** Whether or not listeners in the United States set much store by Argentine protestations, it must be remembered that

the Peluffo speech was beamed at all America. Latin Americans in this country think it unfortunate that the Hull memorandum was issued as a statement of United States policy, bearing the tacit approval of the other American republics, rather than a multilateral agreement presented by some inter-American agency such as the Montevideo Committee for the Defense of the Hemisphere. They hold that the State Department summary justifies to some extent the wedge-driving contention of Buenos Aires that the present crisis is of concern only to the governments of the United States and Argentina. Moreover, some of the Latin American governments may not find themselves in a position to take a firm stand against Argentina even if they want to. Strategically and economically vulnerable countries like Chile and Uruguay feel that something more than moral issues are at stake. In weighing the possibility of following up its strong words by strong action, the United States must realize that, if it advocates such action, it will have, in turn, to give strategic and economic aid to Argentina's close neighbors.

The appointment of Marcial Mora as the new Chilean Ambassador to Washington is seen as a bright spot in a dark situation. Señor Mora, the former head of Chile's organization for the aid of the Allies, Union for Victory, may take an active part not only in mediating in the present crisis but also in improving our relations with the other American states. If, as is sometimes claimed, the stock of the United States in Latin America is "steadily deteriorating," it is now more essential than ever that the democratic elements in the countries friendly to us assume greater practical leadership in hemispheric affairs.

OLIVE HOLMES

## SOME RECENT BOOKS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

*The Time for Decision*, by Sumner Wells. New York, Harper, 1944. \$3.00

The former Undersecretary of State presents a wealth of interesting material on this country's foreign policy during the critical pre-war and war years, stressing the important role that public opinion plays in its formulation, and presents his ideas for post-war international organization. This book is an important contribution to the history of our times.

*U.S. War Aims*, by Walter Lippmann. Boston, Little, Brown, 1944. \$1.50

Mr. Lippmann, writing with his usual brilliancy, presents a highly controversial plan for division of the world into three main regions—the Atlantic Community, the Russian Orbit, and the Chinese Orbit—with the eventual addition of a fourth region embracing the peoples of the Middle East, and bitterly attacks Woodrow Wilson for contemplating a universal organization of nations.

*Via Diplomatic Pouch*, by Douglas Miller. New York, Didier, 1944. \$3.00

The former American commercial attaché in Berlin, widely known for his previous volume *You Can't do Business with Hitler*, here presents confidential reports on the rise of National Socialism which he prepared between 1931 and 1937. His book reveals the extent to which sound information on Hitler's purposes and plans was available to the United States government long before the outbreak of war in Europe.

*The Road to Foreign Policy*, by Hugh Gibson. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.50


In this thought-provoking, frequently tart little book, a well-known career diplomat who, among other assignments, served as American Ambassador to Belgium and Brazil, offers interesting suggestions for closer cooperation between the executive, Congress, and public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy.

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# Washington News Letter



## IS OUR POLICY ON SPAIN A SUCCESS?

As the war in Europe draws to a climax, the United Nations will expect greater contributions from the neutrals than they have received in the past. Already Turkey is contemplating at least a diplomatic break with Germany. The arrival of Soviet troops on the shore of the Baltic Sea would free Sweden from German encirclement and permit it to give positive expression to the pro-Allied sentiments of the Swedish people. The time is also approaching when Spain can cancel all its trade with belligerent Germany.

**HAYES SOUNDS "HARSH" NOTE.** Of all the neutral countries, none has tried American diplomacy as much as Spain. On June 9, a few days before he left Europe for his current visit to the United States, Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes hinted at American dissatisfaction with Spain's cautious neutrality. "At the risk of sounding a harsh note on this happy occasion," he said at a banquet on the eve of the opening of the Sample Fair in Barcelona, "I must frankly recall to you and emphasize the fact that while Spain is today at peace, almost all the rest of the world, including my own country, is at war." He warned that between warring countries and peaceful countries commerce will be subject to "occasional distasteful restrictions."

The main object of our policy in Spain has been to reduce that country's wartime usefulness to Germany to the lowest possible degree. This policy, as expressed in diplomatic negotiations, has often necessitated circumspect public dealings with the Madrid régime—in contrast to the forthrightness of Dr. Hayes' June 9 speech. There has consequently been an ever-present danger that our policy might appear to the world as a reflection of friendship, or at least of tolerance, for the political doctrine of the Franco government, whose ideological affinity with the Nazis outrages democratic sentiments over here. Yet within the limited framework of its policy, the United States has drawn the attention of Spaniards, only a small percentage of whom sympathize with their government, to American ideals of freedom.

In an address in Madrid on January 15, 1943, Dr. Hayes described American war aims in terms of the four freedoms. And the recent Barcelona Fair provided the United States with a new opportunity for publicizing democracy. One section of the exhibit—entitled "Our Hopes for the Future"—was introduced by this sentence: "We Americans today are striving for peace, a peace based on the essential dignity of the common man, a peace that sees no

man slave, all men free, a peace that will allow all nations to share in orderly trade the agricultural, industrial and spiritual wealth of mankind." A more striking portion of the exhibit was a large photograph of the Lincoln Memorial sculpture of Abraham Lincoln, surmounted by the celebrated phrase from the Gettysburg address: "Of the people, for the people, by the people." Lincoln's name in Spain evokes memories above all of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, in which many Americans fought against the Franco armies in the civil war.

The aim of such an exhibit is not to reform the Ministers and close followers of General Franco, but to display for others what Dr. Hayes in his June 9 talk called "samples of intellectual and spiritual enterprise of the United States." Franco himself remains unaffected by democratic sentiments. In an address of July 17 he praised the Falange, Spain's fascist party and the only legal party in the country, for its virility and spirituality.

**MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED.** On July 18, the eighth anniversary of the opening of the Spanish civil war, Hitler sent Franco a message of congratulations. Yet while the two dictators find a common ground in political concepts, they disagree on national policy. Spain has been useful to the United States and on occasion has rebuffed Germany. Franco, for instance, submitted a bill to Berlin for Germany's use of the Spanish Blue Division on the eastern front. Spain has allowed 40,000 refugees from over the Pyrenees to pass through into North Africa, at least 10,000 of whom joined the army of the French Committee of National Liberation. Spain also has reduced its wolfram shipments to Germany and permits our agents to observe sales of wolfram to German buyers in order to restrict smuggling.

Despite these and other concessions, three unanswered questions make it difficult to pass judgment on our policy in Spain. Is Spain's cooperation with the Allies due to Dr. Hayes' diplomacy or to its inherent distaste for war? Could Dr. Hayes have safely pressed Spain for greater concessions, such as liberalization of its policy toward refugees? Should or could the State Department have granted a haven in this country for many anti-Franco Spaniards who have had to seek refuge elsewhere? In other words, is our policy toward Spain determined solely by our desire to prevent aid to Germany, or are we looking beyond immediate military needs, and planning to support pro-democratic Spaniards? **BLAIR BOLLES**

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